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Intersubjectivity --- interactionist or discursive?  
Reflections on Habermas’ critique of Brandom 
 
Piet Strydom 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that there is a marked ambivalence in Habermas’ concept of 
intersubjectivity in that he wavers between an interactionist and a discursive 
understanding. This ambivalence is demonstrated with reference to his recent critique of 
Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatic theory of discursive practice. Although 
Habermas is a leading theorist of discourse as an epistemically steered process, he allows 
his interpretation of Brandom’s theory as suffering from objective idealism to compel 
him to recoil from discourse and to defend a purely interactionist or dialogical position. It 
is argued that the ambivalence in question is related to Habermas’ incomplete 
theorisation of communication as a process of structure formation that unfolds 
sequentially through time on different levels. His architectonic of communicative 
intersubjectivity is marred by a missing concept. His characteristic concept of 
coordination is insufficient and must be complemented by a concept of synthesis at the 
discursive level. 
 
Key words 
Brandom;  communication; coordination; discursive synthesis; Habermas; Luhmann; 
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Introduction 
In a recent essay, Jürgen Habermas (1999a, 2003a) develops a detailed analysis and 
differentiated critique of Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatics as presented in his 
major work entitled Making It Explicit (1994). A central aspect of Habermas’ critique is 
directed against Brandom’s alleged objectivistic understanding of discursive practice. 
The angle from which Habermas undertakes this critique and seeks to correct Brandom’s 
position is represented by his intersubjectivist point of view. Rather than trying to defend 
Brandom, I propose to devote these reflections to a critical analysis of Habermas’ 
position as put forward in the core part of his essay --- that is, particularly section V(2) 
(2003a: 161-66) --- focused on the structure of communication. In the following, I leave 
largely open the question whether Brandom actually takes an objectivist approach to 
discursive practice which derives from his metaphysical conceptual realism and the 
related tendency toward a neo-Hegelian objective idealism which assumes a movement 
of the concept over the heads and behind the backs of the participants in communication, 
as Habermas argues. My focus is rather the conspicuous ambivalence in Habermas 
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regarding an interactionist or dialogical and a discursive approach to intersubjectivity and 
the theoretical implications flowing from it. Above all, a proper understanding of 
intersubjectivity, particularly the process of communication whereby it becomes 
established, is at stake. The central point of the argument is that Habermas fails to 
theorise the process of communication adequately. Although proceeding from the basic 
distinction between interaction or dialogue and discourse, he tends to regard the process 
in a one-dimensional manner as involving the interactive or dialogical coordination of the 
intentions and actions of the participants alone. This raises the question of the missing 
dimension of the process, namely the moment of synthesis of the different contributions 
into a collectively acceptable outcome at the discursive level which is essential for and 
therefore presupposed by the actual attainment of intersubjective coordination. 
In order to present the argument in a comprehensible manner, I first briefly review 
Habermas’ critique of Brandom, then characterise his proposal to correct Brandom’s 
objectivistic tendency, and finally embark on a more detailed analysis and critique of 
Habermas’ position. 
 
Habermas’ critique of Brandom 
In Making It Explicit, Brandom systematically develops an innovative pragmatic analysis 
of language by focusing on discursive practice in the sense of the activities of giving and 
asking for reasons or mutual justification on which the social life of a speech or language 
community depends. Accordingly, he follows the various interrelated roles of speech acts 
in discourse --- from speakers expressing utterances or making claims and thus 
undertaking something and entering into commitments, via interpreters attributing claims 
and commitments to speakers, to all the participants mutually evaluating and assessing or 
keeping score of each other’s position in and contribution to their common discourse. 
Habermas’ critique --- at least, the particular aspect of it I select here as being 
relevant --- turns on a discrepancy he discovers in Brandom’s methodological approach. 
On the one hand, according to his own account, Brandom starts by adopting the 
orientation of a second person which enables him to analyse the utterances of a speaker 
from the perspective of an interlocutor or interpreter participating in discourse. He 
emphatically holds, for instance, that the basic explanatory challenge of his normative 
pragmatic model of discursive practice centrally involves the practical attitude of taking 
and treating speech acts as having the significance of claims (Brandom 1994: 141--42, 
also 161--65; Habermas 2003a: 134--35). Another, or others, must hear a speech act, 
listen to what is being said, understand the claim it raises, and respond to it. On closer 
inspection, however, Habermas (2003a: 162) finds on the other hand that Brandom 
actually constructs the first person-second person or I-thou relation as a first person-third 
person relation: a first person makes an utterance and a third person, who plays the role 
of an observer or spectator rather than an addressee, attributes or imputes the claim 
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implied by the utterance to the speaker and then evaluates its validity and assesses its 
import. 
That the attribution, evaluation and assessment tasks are not carried out by a 
second person, as Brandom initially intimated, is borne out for Habermas by the fact that 
a person is able to fulfil the role of a second person only if an ‘I’ orients him- or herself 
towards him or her as a ‘thou’, only if a first person addresses a second person with the 
expectation of a reply. The shift from a first person-second person relation to a first 
person-third person relation instead in Brandom’s actual analysis implies in Habermas’ 
view that he not only confuses two distinct levels of communication, but also ignores the 
grammatical role of the second person. On the whole, then, Brandom neglects the 
complex interrelation of the first, second and third person perspectives, which means that 
he operates with an inadequate concept of communication. 
From this circumstance, Habermas (2003a: 160, 163--65) draws the conclusion 
that Brandom adopts an objectivist, theoreticist and methodological individualist 
approach which is unsuited to the analysis of discursive practice. The last word is given 
to a spectator or observer of a speech act who attributes a claim to a speaker and 
evaluates it, thus making possible an objectivistic description of the process of 
communication or discursive practice. The spectator or observer is actually assuming the 
role of a theoretician who regards understanding an utterance not as the hermeneutic 
interpretation of a text, but rather as an operation of imputing his or her own 
interpretation and evaluation to the speaker. The process of communication or discursive 
practice itself is conceived as emerging from the inferences which each individual 
participant draws for him- or herself based on their observation of one another, rather 
than as the outcome of a cooperative accomplishment. 
 
Habermas’ corrective proposal 
Essentially, Habermas’ proposal is to adopt intersubjectivism as a corrective to 
Brandom’s objectivism.  
Habermas’ (2003a: 162--64) prime target is Brandom’s reputed tendency to treat 
communication or discursive practice in terms of the relation between a first person and a 
third person or between a speaker and an observing interpreter. As against this particular 
emphasis, he insists instead on the primacy of the relation between a first person and a 
second person. A first person, on the one hand, is a speaker who connects an intention 
with an utterance and, as an interlocutor, uses his or her assertion to demand a public 
reply, whether positive or negative, from an addressee. Such a response is necessary to 
either confirm what is at stake in the intention of the speaker or to bring him or her to 
revise it, and thus to produce an obligation relevant to the continuation of the exchange 
between the two parties. A second person, on the other hand, is one who is drawn into 
communication by a speaker’s orientation toward him or her, thus becoming an addressee 
who is expected to respond in a meaningful way to the speaker’s utterance. Habermas 
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stresses the status of both the first and second persons as performers who are directly 
involved in the interaction and whose perspectives structurally interpenetrate so that their 
roles are interchangeable. This contrasts sharply with third persons who are disinterested 
interpreters, observers or spectators who are uninvolved, at best just registering what is 
being said by the performing interlocutors and waiting to see what transpires between or 
among them. 
It is this distinction between directly involved parties to an exchange or a dispute 
who adopt a performative attitude towards one another, on the one hand, and observing 
bystanders or spectators who interpret what is going on between or among interlocutors, 
on the other, that leads Habermas (2003a: 163) to claim that Brandom confounds two 
distinct dimensions of communication. Whereas the latter at first had in mind the direct 
communication between speakers and addressees, his emphasis shifted and then became 
fixed on the indirect communication between the speakers and the spectators listening to 
them. Habermas’ intersubjectivist corrective to Brandom’s alleged objectivistic tendency 
is to keep these two dimensions strictly apart and to make the direct communicative 
relation between speaker and addressee the paradigmatic case. 
The second component of Habermas’ proposal is to embed the first person-second 
person relation in the broader context serving as its carrier or substrate. As against 
Brandom’s tendency --- as reputedly exhibited by his models of baseball, court 
proceedings, and ballroom dancing1 --- to treat communication or discursive practice as a 
self-sufficient process comprised of the contributions of individuals who mutually 
observe, inform and evaluate each other, Habermas (2003a: 162--66) elaborates the first 
principle of the theory of intersubjectivity. Communication or discursive practice is a 
cooperative process of learning which unfolds within the limits of a social environment 
and the constraints of an independently existing world. Within its social environment, the 
process on the one hand takes place against the background of an intersubjective 
lifeworld or within the shared meaning horizon of a linguistically disclosed world. On the 
other, it is guided by a community of justification which directs it toward the goal of a 
discursively achieved agreement. If successful, the process culminates in a collectively 
accepted result which allows the coordination of the plans and actions of the 
independently deciding participants. For Habermas (2003a: 164, 165), the specificity of 
linguistically mediated communication, which according to him is not adequately 
appreciated by Brandom, lies in such coordination and more generally the social 
integration which follows from it. For Habermas, this emphasis directs the attention 
toward the dependence of communication on the necessity of keeping consonant those 
beliefs and opinions of participants that are relevant for coordinating their plans and 
actions. Central to the intersubjectivist conception of the process of communication or 
discursive practice, then, is the possibility for the participants to converge in their 
recognition of the same validity claim and to come to share knowledge of that which they 
are communicating about.2 It is only on this basis, according to Habermas (2003a: 166), 
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that the intersubjective justification of a claim raised in the process of communication or 
discursive practice could allow the burden of the warrant for its validity to be shouldered 
collectively. 
It is advisable in the present context, finally, to highlight an additional, albeit 
remarkably brief, clarification Habermas makes to his account of communication or 
discursive practice embedded in an intersubjective context. Despite its brevity, it is of 
central importance for both an understanding and a critical assessment of Habermas’ 
critique of Brandom, as will become apparent later. The clarification concerns the 
structure of communication or discursive practice and its social significance. On one 
occasion, Habermas insists that ‘the complex interconnections of the first, second and 
third person perspectives’ (2003a: 162) must, by contrast with Brandom, be borne in 
mind throughout. And on another, he suggests that the ‘grammatical role’ (163) of each 
the three types of person involved in communication, including the second person 
ignored by Brandom, need to be considered in principle. More formally, the reference 
here is to the linguistic system of personal pronouns which he discussed in various places 
in his earlier writings (e.g. Habermas and Luhmann 1971: 193--94; Habermas 1987: 35--
6, 102--5). The social significance of these structural parameters of communication or 
discursive practice should be obvious. The establishment of interpersonal relations within 
the framework of first, second and third person perspectives through the use of personal 
pronouns brings to the fore a whole intersubjective world by actualising a deep-seated 
network of relations of not just membership but also potential membership in a social 
group. 
 
Critique of Habermas 
Habermas regards Brandom’s Making It Explicit as an innovative, detailed and tenacious 
elaboration of a programme of formal pragmatics he himself among others has been 
envisaging since the nineteen-seventies. Sharing a pragmatic approach, Habermas thus 
fully accepts Brandom’s focus on the social practices of a linguistic community in which 
subjects capable of speech and action engage. Brandom’s specific concern is what he 
calls ‘linguistic’ or ‘discursive practice’ and conceives as acts of communication which 
involve ‘giving and asking for reasons’ and are regulated by the participants’ mutual 
‘scorekeeping’ (1994: 5, 141). In his analysis, Habermas speaks interchangeably of 
discursive practice, discourse, argumentation, communication, communicative exchange, 
linguistic communication, everyday communication and interaction. This varied usage, 
which is present also in the original German version of the essay under discussion 
(Habermas 1999a), at first sight looks like a case of conceptual looseness. Indeed, in my 
view, it is the source of a particular ambivalence and hence lack of clarity and even 
mismatched analysis in his critique of Brandom. 
Light is shed on this conceptual imprecision by a basic theoretical distinction on 
which Habermas’ position rests since 1970 --- namely, the distinction between 
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‘communicative action’ (or interaction) and ‘discourse’ (e.g. Habermas and Luhmann 
1971: 114--22; Habermas 1974: 16--9; 1979: 3--4). Here discourse is conceived as a 
special, reflexive form of communication which indeed takes place in and through the 
medium of communication, yet stands in a relation of opposition to ordinary everyday 
communication in so far as it stops the latter in its tracks, problematizes it, opens it up, 
induces reflection on its implicit assumptions, makes the latter explicit and thus explains 
and clarifies communication by reference to those very assumptions (Strydom 2000: 42--
9). I am convinced that this distinction between interaction and discourse is crucial also 
for understanding what is actually happening in Habermas’ critical engagement with 
Brandom’s work. A close examination of the relevant writings of our two authors shows, 
to my mind, that whereas Brandom focuses on discourse, or the ‘discursive practice’ of 
‘giving and asking for reasons’ (1994: 5), Habermas for the most part criticises Brandom 
from the point of view of interaction. Instead of discourse, he holds to a theory of 
everyday communication or interaction, or one might say a theory of dialogue. Rather 
than a discursive intersubjectivist position, therefore, he assumes an interactionist or 
dialogical intersubjectivism. 
In the development of his critique of Brandom’s objectivist conception of the 
process of communication and his concurrent theoreticist attitude, Habermas seems to fall 
in the trap of interactionism or dialogicism due to a forgetfulness of discourse. Various 
pieces of evidence can be mustered to support this interpretation. His undivided attention 
to the first person-second person relation from an internal lifeworld perspective is of first 
importance here. Not only is the relation between the first and second person for him the 
essential component of communication, but he also sees the understanding by an 
addressee of what a speaker means, which in turn requires something like the 
hermeneutic interpretation of a text, as the essential quality of this relation itself and 
hence also of communication. In the course of the development of this relation in the 
process of communication, therefore, he regards the first and second person as 
converging in their understanding of the claim at stake up to the point where they share 
the same knowledge. The emphasis here is on the I-thou relation, mutual understanding 
through hermeneutic interpretation, convergence and sharing. There could be little 
criticism of this approach if communication in the sense of internal lifeworld or everyday 
communication were in question, but at issue between Habermas and Brandon is more 
than such interaction or dialogue. What is happening here is that Habermas generalises 
communication in the sense of interaction or dialogue to the level of discourse, with the 
result that he obliterates the latter and thus misses this second dimension of 
communication. His own axiomatic distinction which is crucial for grasping the multi-
dimensionality of the process of communication falls by the wayside.  
A brief analysis delivers evidence backing up this claim. Notwithstanding the 
assumption of a shared horizon of meaning, the interactionist or dialogical approach 
regards sociality or the outcome of a social situation as depending on the intentions and 
Strydom, ‘Intersubjectivity’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 32(2), 2006, pp. 155-72 
 
 7 
actions of participants. It results from the coordination of subjective perspectives and 
individual actions. The outcome is given shape and form by the coordination of the 
meanings of the communicative actions of each participant which are hermeneutically 
interpreted and understood by the other participants. Such coordination is a meaningfully 
structured process of cooperation among the participants that gathers together the 
different acts of understanding and agreement so as to culminate in intersubjective 
understanding and agreement among the participants. This could be summarised by 
saying that the assumption is made that a speaker communicates a meaning in such a way 
to an addressee that the latter understands it in a manner identical to the speaker, with the 
implication that the speaker could be said to control the reception of his or her meaning 
and its understanding by the addressee.3 
On close inspection, however, it becomes apparent that the interactionist or 
dialogical account is not adequate to capture the specificity of discursive practice 
involving giving and asking for reasons. Habermas demands of Brandom that he takes 
into consideration throughout the complex interrelations of the first, second and third 
person perspectives instead of screening out the first person-second person relation. But 
he himself then continues to reduce this complex threefold relation to the first person-
second person relation to the virtual exclusion of the third person perspective. It is 
remarkable that, in an earlier publication, Habermas (1997: 133--34) himself presented a 
convincing critique of dialogical philosophy. Proceeding from the assumption of the sign-
mediated nature of communication and the full system of personal pronouns, he pointed 
out that dialogical philosophy operates with a selective reconstruction of the full structure 
of communication. Replacing the reflection model of the epistemological subject-object 
relation with the communicative model of reciprocal self-understanding, it focuses 
exclusively on the I-Thou relation. The result is a narrowing of the structure of 
understanding to the existential-ethical experience of the participants consequent on 
felicitous communication. As against this reductive tendency, he insisted that 
communication involves more than the ego-alter relation. It presupposes the integration 
of the performative attitude of the participating first and second persons with the third 
person attitude. Here Habermas obviously went beyond the interactionist or dialogical 
account he offers in section V(2) of the essay on Brandom. In the earlier publication, the 
full threefold structure of communication and its sign-mediated nature are manifest in 
sharp profile --- a complex which makes itself felt in particular when we shift from 
interaction to discourse where the participants are required to engage in public practices 
of justification. In the Brandom essay, by contrast, Habermas looses sight of 
communication in the full sense of the word as well as apparently the Peircean theory of 
signs which he elsewhere accepts as being presupposed by it (Habermas 1991: 9--33; 
1996: 13--4)4. But this still leaves the pressing question of the role of the third person.  
In his critique of dialogical philosophy, Habermas (1997: 134) regards the third 
person attitude as one towards something in the objective world. Likewise in his critique 
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of Brandom, he indeed proposes to correct Brandom’s conceptual realism also by 
replacing it with a pragmatic realism which acknowledges the resistance of an 
independent objective world (Habermas 2003a: 155--59). Yet in discourse, particularly in 
the practical type of discourse we are familiar with in social life taking the form of public 
controversy, debate or dispute characterised by the practice of justification, the third 
person perspective enters by no means solely in the form of the neutral attitude towards 
something in the objective world. The latter attitude at best brings into play only ‘it’, but 
not yet the personal pronouns ‘he’, ‘she’ or ‘they’. Habermas gives an unmistakable 
indication of this more complex situation in a recent outline of what may be called his 
cognitive-epistemic model of discourse (1998: 46--7, 102--3). According to this model, 
the structuration of discourse takes place in such a way that it can be said to be an 
epistemically steered process. Ethical and pragmatic reasons in the sense of individual 
participants’ motives and values are not ignored, but generalised and treated as valid 
epistemic contributions to discourse that are intersubjectively acceptable. On the one 
hand, the participants create their own reality by making individual contributions to the 
process through which this achievement is realised and, on the other, they are all without 
exception subordinate to the structures of the performatively shared situation which thus 
become established and collectively accepted --- yet leaving room for the relational 
structure of otherness and difference which secures the retention of both differences and 
the particular. What this position implies, in my estimation, is that here not just the 
participants assuming first and second person roles and a reference to the objective world 
are of importance, but at the same time also epistemic properties that are discursively 
constructed and collectively valid since they are acceptable from the third person 
perspective.  
With this circumscription of discourse, Habermas undoubtedly goes well beyond 
the interactionist or dialogical position he plays out against Brandom, and simultaneously 
he hints, albeit rather obliquely, at the place of the third person perspective in such a 
process. In his critique of Brandom, first, he fixes on meanings remaining identical in the 
transition from the first person to the second person, so that every response is seen as 
directly connected to a speech act, while the speaker controls the addressee’s 
understanding. In the case of his cognitive-epistemic model of discourse, by contrast, 
there is a certain openness or contingency of meaning that, precisely because of the 
epistemic role of the discursive process, allows the participants to maintain different 
interpretations of the same issue without precluding their potential coordination. In his 
critique of Brandom, second, he is emphatic about the inclusion only of the first and 
second person perspectives embodied by the directly involved participants, but in a 
process of cognitive-epistemic structure formation such as a public controversy, debate or 
dispute there is present also others who may be only indirectly involved yet are 
nevertheless indispensable for the epistemic authority of the rules or structures which 
become established. They constitute the audience or, more properly, the public, the 
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embodiment of the third person perspective, to whom the participants appeal for their 
support in dealing with each other and who, in turn, observes the participants and 
evaluates, judges and comments on their communication and behaviour, thus exerting a 
significant influence on the definition of reality and the related decision-making 
emerging from the joint discursive process.5 
It is indeed remarkable that Habermas should overlook the third person 
perspective in the guise of the epistemic role and authority of the public since elsewhere 
he is acutely aware of its significance in public discourse: ‘But the political influence that 
the actors gain through public communication must ultimately rest on the resonance and 
indeed the approval of a lay public whose composition is egalitarian. The public of 
citizens must be convinced by comprehensible and broadly interesting contributions to 
issues it finds relevant. The public audience possesses final authority, because it is 
constitutive for the internal structure of the public sphere, the only place where actors 
appear. There can be no public sphere without a public’ (1996: 364). Later in Truth and 
Justification containing the piece on Brandom, he comparably submits: ‘But before it can 
be considered as a general interest in public discourse, every interest that is to “count” 
morally in case of doubt must be convincingly interpreted and grounded as well as 
translated into a relevant claim from the perspective of those affected’ (2003: 269). Here 
it should be pointed out in parenthesis that, taken together, the references to the ‘public’ 
and ‘those affected’ contain the important suggestion that, although the public in one 
respect embodies social validity and authority, it should not summarily be reduced to this 
and thus robbed of its epistemic authority and guardianship of epistemic validity. Even in 
his discussion of Brandom’s example of a court case involving a prosecutor and a 
defence lawyer arguing before a judge and jury, in which an understanding of the 
threefold structure of communication is clearly available, Habermas (2003a: 162--63) 
dismisses the judge and jury as spectators who are waiting to see what happens. Instead 
of sensing the potential for highlighting the full structure of communication, he reads into 
Brandom two distinct levels of communication which need to be kept strictly apart --- the 
communication of those directly involved and the indirect communication of the speakers 
with the spectators who are listening to them. It is plain to see that here Habermas 
completely ignores the discursive practice that is underway. Rather than being kept apart, 
these two dimensions obviously require to be treated as being intimately related. What 
happens here, theoretically speaking, is that Habermas remains a captive of the concept 
of the ‘double contingency’ (1996: 18, 139)6 of social interaction appropriated from the 
classical tradition of social theory, rather than being able, despite his theory of discourse, 
to make a transition to the more adequate concept of ‘triple contingency’, as I have called 
it elsewhere (Strydom 1999a, 1999b, 2001).7 He fixes his focus on the twofold first 
person-second person relation and the problem of the contingency of meaning within that 
restricted framework, instead of including also the third person perspective that would 
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allow him to come to grips with the full threefold structure of communication and the 
higher level of contingency relevant to this more complex framework. 
Elsewhere in Truth and Justification than the chapter on Brandom where he 
surprisingly confines himself to an interactionist or dialogical position, Habermas on 
various occasions discusses crucial characteristics of discourse. He indeed sees discourse 
as a language game, yet beyond limiting contextualist implications it is clearly a special 
language game for him in that it at one and the same time represents ‘the forum of 
justification’ (2003: 102) and a process of ‘construction’ (2003: 44, 47) which takes off 
when new issues arise, compelling the development of new norms and their justification 
in the light of new challenges. As such, discourse exerts a certain ‘constraint’ that 
becomes visible through the ‘decentering’ of the participants’ perspectives or a distancing 
from themselves which the process in the course of its unfolding requires of them (2003: 
105, 109, 234, 270). The constraint and decentering on the part of the participants are 
indications that the process of the joint discursive construction of a common world is in a 
significant sense a learning process (2003: 105, 161). In the interactionist or dialogical 
account in the Brandom essay, by contrast, the identity of meaning, the hermeneutic 
interpretation of the meaning of speech acts, and the control of understanding leave no 
room for such constraint, decentering and learning.8 Indeed, there is something else that 
is still missing even here and should therefore be added to constraint, decentering and 
learning --- namely, openness of meaning that, in keeping with the full threefold structure 
of communication and its sign-mediated nature, is best conceived in terms of triple 
contingency. 
Rather than applying his insights into constraint, decentering and learning to 
Brandom, Habermas instead shrinks back from the consequences of thinking discourse 
through to the end. There are in fact indications that he is afraid of the concept of a non-
linear, dynamic process which breaks through the limits of intentionality, since in his 
view it inevitably entails fatalistic implications. The model of such a process guiding him 
in Truth and Justification is the objective, non-human or even anti-human process 
represented by the currently influential forms of Quinean naturalism and Heideggerian 
idealism (e.g. 2003: 22--6; 284). Perceiving a similar thrust of an impersonal process in 
Brandom’s tendency towards Hegelian objectivism which celebrates the movement of the 
concept, he reacts by adopting an interactionist or dialogical rather than a discursive 
position. This leads him to give a foreshortened account of discursive practice in 
Brandom as a self-sufficient process made up of the contributions of individuals who 
mutually observe each other and therefore cannot arrive at intersubjective coordination of 
their actions. To conceive of discourse as a non-linear, dynamic process of structure 
formation not fully under the control of any of the participants, yet nevertheless forming 
part of the larger process of communication, does not imply that it necessarily falls in the 
category of a strong, objectivistic naturalism or idealism. Habermas indeed emphasizes 
the centrality of the ‘cooperative learning process by way of the constructive 
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interpretations of a communication community’ (2003a: 161), but neither the dynamics 
nor the serrated profile of the communicative process come through clearly. What he 
should have appreciated is that it is a temporally and hence sequentially unfolding 
process that starts from individual contributions and then, through joint construction 
involving not only cooperation but also competition and even conflict, flowers into a 
moment of discursive structure formation giving rise to a shared collective outcome 
which, while differently interpreted by the participants, eventually allows them to 
coordinate their actions.9 Despite recognising elsewhere that discourse is an epistemically 
steered process and despite stressing that it involves a learning process exerting constraint 
and requiring decentring on the part of the participants, Habermas’ critique of Brandom 
reveals a lack of a sufficiently articulated concept not only of the temporal or sequential 
phasing but also of the structuration of the process of communication and discursive 
construction. 
If one considers Habermas’ distinction between interaction and discourse from a 
processual perspective, it becomes apparent that it is impossible to operate with the 
concept of coordination alone. A second concept complementary to coordination is 
required to capture the different levels of operation of the communicative process as well 
as the range of achievements gained in its course. Whereas Habermas focuses on 
interaction and the coordination of individuals that becomes possible through this 
medium in the course of the process, he leaves the moment of synthesis achieved through 
joint --- i.e., both competitive and cooperative --- discursive structure formation unnamed 
and unaccounted for. Previously, I have suggested that there is a certain conceptual 
blockage in Habermas’ understanding of discourse. It can be attributed to the fact that he 
does not consistently embrace the full structure of communication and the threefold sign 
relation underpinning it. Behind this inconsistency, in my view, lies the fact that he 
remains attached to the classical sociological concept of the ‘double contingency’ of the 
first and second person perspectives in social interaction and, as a consequence, makes 
their ‘coordination’ the central focus of his theory. What he ignores, despite bringing in 
the public or all those potentially affected, is ‘triple contingency’ and hence the 
‘synthesis’ of the inputs of the participants in the course of the joint constructive process 
that, by a discursive detour, provides a basis for the eventual coordination of the 
participants in the first place. Habermas’ narrow double contingency perspective must be 
extended to the broader triple contingency perspective, and the coordination of the plans 
and actions of the directly involved participants must be seen in relation to the non-linear 
dynamics of the discursive synthesis of those contributions of the participants that are 
judged to be epistemically relevant by the public as well as by the participants themselves 
from the discursively activated perspective of those potentially affected. Were he to 
systematise his position along the suggested lines, he would eliminate the ambivalence I 
have identified by bridging the gap between an interactionist and a discursive concept of 
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intersubjectivity without having to bow his knee before the objective idealism to which 
he thinks Brandom is prone. 
 
Conclusion 
I have endeavoured to show that there is a clearly identifiable ambivalence in Habermas 
that is conspicuously present in his analysis and critique of Brandom. I have suggested 
that it is most immediately fed by an unjustifiable tendency on his part to retreat from 
discourse into interaction or dialogue due to a not entirely mistaken apprehension 
regarding objective, impersonal processes --- in Brandom’s case, according to Habermas, 
the objective idealist movement of the concept. Instead of an intersubjective discursive 
position, Habermas on such occasions of recoil comes to represent an intersubjective 
dialogical position that cannot be defended. What he does not keep in mind throughout is 
that not all objective processes are on a par. Even in our type of society where 
communication has been unleashed to an unprecedented degree, discourse as a concept 
complementary to interaction does not admit of being assimilated without more ado to 
cybernetic and informational processes. Like these processes, discourse also has its 
rightful place. Rather than falling back exclusively on interaction or dialogue, this fact 
has to be established unequivocally. This means that even if Habermas is correct about 
Brandom’s objectivism, his counter-position should not have been interactionist or 
dialogicist, but rather one that acknowledges the discursive dimension between these two 
extremes. Finally, I have also sought to suggest that Habermas’ strategy in dealing with 
Brandom is related to his apparent inclination to stop short of fully utilizing his theory of 
communication as a process embracing not only interaction but also discursive 
construction. 
It is only when Habermas compensates for this theoretical deficit, which would be 
more in line with the work of a number of younger authors inspired by him (e.g. Miller 
1992, 2002; Eder 1996, 2000; Strydom 1999a, 2000, 2002; Delanty 1999a, 1999b; Trenz 
and Eder 2004), that he would be able to fend off the concerted and vehement attack that 
a whole school following Luhmann (e.g. Sutter 1997; Hörning, Ahrens and Gerhard 
1997; Sutter and Charlton 1999) is at present waging against him. What both Habermas 
and these critics of his have in common, ironically, is the debilitating assumption of the 
traditional concept of double contingency. 
 
Notes 
My appreciation is due to the members of the Pragmatic Sociology Working Group at 
University College Cork, particularly Pat O’Mahony, for their responses to some of the 
ideas in this article at one of its meetings in early 2004. I wish to acknowledge also that 
the writing of this article benefited from research done for a project on collective 
responsibility in the risk society conducted at University College Cork within the 
framework of the interfaculty programme ‘Science of Environmental Risk’ under the 
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auspices of the Irish Higher Education Authority’s Programme for Research in Third 
Level Institutions, Cycle 3, 2002-2005. 
 
1 It is interesting to note that Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990: 59, endnote 8) analysis of dance as 
a model of social integration involving the ‘synchronization of the homogeneous and 
orchestration of the heterogeneous’ indirectly supports Brandom’s example of Fred 
Astaire and Ginger Rogers dancing to illustrate how different things are being done at the 
same time as the participants are engaged in a shared practice. He outlined this example 
in a letter to Habermas (2003a: 165, 309) who interprets it as proof of an objectivistic, 
methodological individualist position. Where Bourdieu and, I think, Brandom see a 
shared situational structure or, rather, a structuring practice which allows participants 
nevertheless to execute different yet coordinated actions, Habermas insists that the 
participants are at best engaged in ‘mutual observation’ and that this excludes ‘the 
possibility for them to converge in their intersubjective recognition of the same validity 
claim and [to] share knowledge in the strict sense of the term’ (p. 165). 
2 Here we witness an insistence on ‘convergence’ and ‘sharing’ which leads Habermas, 
as intimated in the previous note, to a foreshortened analysis of intersubjectivity --- 
foreshortened in the sense of a lack of attention to both the mode of structuration and the 
temporal dimension of communication. Below, I return in more detail to this problem. 
3 The interactionist or dialogical intersubjectivism extracted from Habermas’ critique of 
Brandom and characterised in this paragraph has been an object of criticism from various 
sides. Ulrich Oevermann (e.g. 1983), the minimally published yet enormously influential 
Frankfurt sociological colleague of Habermas who partially under Theodor Adorno’s 
impact founded ‘objective hermeneutics’, was perhaps the first to highlight the limits of 
this position. Niklas Luhmann (1987, 1995) was also a dogged critic whose systems 
theoretical concept of communication deriving from Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics 
became a model for authors inspired by him, such as for example Karl Hörning, Daniela 
Ahrens and Anette Gerhard (1997), Tilmann Sutter and Michael Charlton (1999) and 
Loet Leydesdorff (2000). The problem with Luhmann’s position is that he conceives of 
communication as the unity of information, utterance and understanding to the exclusion 
of the acceptance or rejection of what is understood (1995: 147). The most interesting 
recent development that is critical of Habermas is represented by a group of authors who 
adopt Luhmann’s concept of communication yet seek to build Oevermann’s objective 
hermeneutics into it, for example, the authors collected in Tilmann Sutter (1997). Also 
here, however, the concept of system is so strong that it hardly allows discourse. Apart 
from the outside, however, critique has been developed over many years also by authors 
inspired by Habermas himself. This immanent critique was first coherently formulated by 
Max Miller (1986, 1992) who drew on authors such as Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky but 
was also influenced by Oevermann and Luhmann and, in turn, played some role in the 
merging of the latter two. In effect, Miller showed that whoever engages in 
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communicative action necessarily enters into a social relationship possessing structural 
features that are presupposed by the participants. Against this background, it became 
apparent that Habermas’ abiding attachment to an individualist approach to social reality 
is accompanied by his neglect of the structural nature of social relations. His latest 
statement of position is to be found in Miller (2002). Pursuing this suggestion, but also 
borrowing from Alain Touraine, Bourdieu and even Luhmann, Klaus Eder (1988, 1996) 
since the mid-1980s sought to identify structural models of practice and to make them 
amenable to empirical research --- that is, without giving up communicative reason in 
favour of practical reason. Recently, Eder has restated both his critique of Habermas’ 
tendential psychologism and individualism and his own attempt to theorise the dimension 
of structuration (1999a, 2000). 
4 The theory of signs in question here is Charles Sanders Peirce’s threefold semiotic 
version as distinct from the twofold structuralist (or semiological) version of Ferdinand 
de Saussure and his followers. On Peirce, see e.g. Karl-Otto Apel (1981), and on the 
distinction between semiotic and structuralist theories, see e.g. Eugene Rochberg-Halton 
(1982) and Hans Joas (1992). In addition to intersubjectivity, Luhmann (1995: 146--47) 
also rejects a theory of signs as irrelevant for understanding communication, but what he 
has in mind is Jacques Derrida’s semiology. In this dispute, interestingly, we witness the 
symptoms of a slowly emerging battle in the current post-disciplinary situation over the 
most appropriate trans-discipline of our time: systems theory (or cybernetics), 
information theory or semiotics. 
5 Compare my critique of Habermas in terms of the concept of resonance in Strydom 
(2003). 
6 Not only Habermas is disadvantaged by the retention of this traditional concept, but so 
too are Luhmann (1992: 378-79; 1995: 103--36) and his followers (e.g. Sutter 1997: 303-
-36). 
7 See also Hans-Jörg Trenz and Eder’s (2004) creative analytical use of the concept of 
triple contingency. Here, however, a cautionary note should be sounded against a purely 
functionalist theory of democracy. 
8 One of the most persistent theorists of collective learning processes, Klaus Eder, has 
recently again pointed out that Habermas’ assumption of the centrality of the cognitively 
competent individual militates against an adequate understanding of learning which, 
instead, requires recognition of the fact that the actor is ultimately only the medium for 
the action-directing cultural models representing society. It is ‘less the actor’s 
competence than the script followed by the actor’ (2000: 223) that is of importance in 
collective learning. If this argument covers the discursive moment of structure formation 
and the structuration of the process of communication, however, then the next step in the 
temporal sequence, namely the different interpretations of the discursive outcome and 
their coordination under given situational conditions, is still left open. 
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9 For comparable elaborations of this complex theoretical premise and corresponding 
critically oriented empirical analyses in diverse fields, see Eder (1996, 1999b), Delanty 
(1999a) and Strydom (2000, 2002).  
University College Cork, Department of Sociology, 
     Cork, Ireland 
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